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REVISED ARTICLES 3 AND 4: SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGES IN THE UCC
by
Arthur M. Magaldi*
Ivan Fox**
one of the principal purposes for the passage of the UCC
was to make uniform the laws that people involved in business
transactions would encounter in every state in the Uniteg
States. A second important purpose of the UCC was to update
or "fine tune" the common law principles that had existed for
many years, since some of theserprinciples no longer seemed
relevant or beneficial in the latter years of the twentieth
century.
Few would dispute the success of the Code in
achieving the twin objectives of fostering uniformity and
updating the common law.
The UCC, now in effect for over a quarter century, has
also been the subject of study and scrutiny. The American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws have decided that it is again time to
update and change laws governing commercial transactions.
They have revised Articles 3 and 4 of the ucc. Article 3 has
been renamed simply, "Negotiable Instruments."
Our
will discuss some of the major changes of this
revision.
As of October, 1992, nineteen states have enacted
the revisions as law.
Negotiability
It has been an article of faith that an instrument must
be issued payable to order or to bearer if it is to be
classified as a negotiable instrument. 2 The order or bearer
terminology has frequently been referred to as the magic words
of negotiability.
An instrument which is made payable to
order or bearer indicates the drawer's or maker's intention
not to limit payment to the named payee and is therefore one
of the bases for protecting later holders in due course. The
traditional rule has held that an instrument not issued
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payable to order or to bearer which is later transferred to a
good faith purchaser for value cannot result in the later
holder becoming a holder in due course.
It is well
established that there can only be a holder in due course of
a negotiable instrument.
A transferee from the payee of a
non-negotiable instrument is considered merely an assignee of
the contract rights of the payee who receives no greater
rights than the payee enjoyed. If the issuer, i.e., the maker
or drawer, has a defense which can be. asserted against the
payee, the defense can be asserted
later transferees
of a non-negotiable instrument since such transferees can
enjoy no greater rights than the original payee.
Revised Article 3 to a large extent continues to require
that the traditional ingredients be present in an instrument
for it to be considered negotiable. A substantial change has
been made, however, in the requirements for negotiability of
checks.
The revision provides that a check which otherwise
meets the requirements for negotiability will not be rendered
non-negotiable because it is not issued payable to order or to
bearer. 3 The official comments to Section 3-104(c) provide
the reasons for the change. "Subsection (c) is based on the
belief that it is good policy to treat checks, which are
payment instruments, as negotiable instruments whether or not
they contain the words 'to the order of.'
These words are
almost always pre-printed on the check form.
Occasionally,
the drawer of a check may strike out these words before
issuing the check. In the past, some credit unions used check
forms that did not contain the quoted words. Absence of the
quoted words can easily be overlooked and should not affect
the rights of holders who pay money or give credit for a check
without being aware that it is not in the conventional form."
Based on the official comments to the revised legislation, it
is clear that the intention of the revision is to protect
unsuspecting transferees of instruments which would in all
other respects be considered checks but which lack the "order
of" terminology. Inasmuch as this is generally pre-printed on
checks, the revision recognizes the fact that a transferee
would generally not be examining the instrument for this
element and could easily overlook the fact that it is missing.
The exception applies solely to checks and other instruments
must contain the order or bearer terminology to be considered
negotiable. 4
Under the traditional view, if a buyer paid for goods
with a check which was non-negotiable because the check was
not issued payable to the order of the payee or to the bearer,
and payment of the check was stopped because of a breach of
warranty concerning the goods, a subsequent good faith
transferee of the check could not be considered a holder in
due course. If the later holder sued the buyer, the original
issuer of the check, the holder would be subject to the
defense of breach of warranty and would be treated as an
assignee of the original payee-seller's rights. Under Revised

Section 3-104 (c), the lack of order or bearer terminology
would not make the instrument non-negotiable, and later
holders could be protected as holders in due course .
It should be noted that a bank money order is treated as
a check even though it bears the words "money order. 115
Accordingly, the order or bearer terminology is not essential
for a bank money order to be considered negotiable.
Particular Fund Doctrine
The new Article 3 changes the particular fund rule as it
affects the negotiability of all instruments governed by
Article 3, i.e., promissory notes, checks, and drafts. It is
well
established
that
only
instruments
that
contain
unconditional promises or orders to pay money are considered
to be negotiable.
The traditional rule holds that an
instrument must be based on the
credit of the maker or
drawer and payment must not be limited or restricted to a
particular source or fund. 6
An instrument in which the
promise or order to pay is limited to payment only from a
particular fund or source is considered to be conditional and
therefore non-negotiable.
For example, an instrument which
states that it is payable only from the funds in a certain
account or only from the proceeds from a particular sale is
non-negotiable.
The traditional theory is that, when one
orders or promises to pay only from a particular fund and from
no other source, the instrument is inherently conditional
because if there are not funds available in that particular
fund then there exists no promise or order to utilize other
funds. Therefore, the payment is conditioned upon there being
a sufficient sum to provide payment for the instrument from
that source alone.
Revised Section 3-106(b)(ii) provides that a promise or
order is not made conditional and the instrument rendered nonnegotiable because payment is limited to a particular fund or
source.
"This reverses the result of former Section 3105(2)(b). There is no cogent reason why the general credit
of a legal entity must be pledged to have a negotiable
instrument.
Market forces determine the marketability of
instruments of this kind.
If potential buyers don't want
promises or orders that are payable only from a particular
source or fund, they won't take them, but Article 3 should
apply. 117
Promises or orders which are subject to express
conditions or subject to or governed by another writing
continue to be non-negotiable under the revised Article 3.
Similarly, if the rights or obligations with respect to the
promise or order are stated in another writing, the instrument
is non-negotiable.
Restrictive Indorsements
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Revised Section 3-206 (b) changes the rule concerning
restrictive indorsements and the manner in which they must be
treated by those paying an instrument. The revision provides:
"An indorsement stating a condition to the right of the
indorsee to receive payment does not affect the right of the
indorsee to enforce the instrument.
A person paying the
instrument or taking it for value or collection may disregard
the condition, and the rights and liabilities of that person
are not affected by whether the condition has been
Prior to revision, an indorsement on a note, "Pay A l.f A
delivers 10 bales of hay pursuant to contract", would impose
on the maker the duty to ascertain whether A in fact delivered
10 bales of hay before the instrument can safely be paid. The
revision frees the maker from the duty of ascertaining whether
the condition had been fulfilled.
Where the rev1.s1.on is not in effect, conditional
indorsements on checks make them virtually uncollectible at
banks since the latter will not want to undertake the risk of
determining whether the condition has been fulfilled. Revised
Section 3-206 (b) relieves makers of notes and drawees of
checks and drafts of the responsibility of determining whether
conditions contained in indorsements have been fulfilled.
In the example above, the note could be paid by the maker
without inquiry into whether the bales of hay had been
delivered.
In the event the note was negotiated by A to a
· subsequent holder, the subsequent holder's rights are not
affected by the conditional indorsement, i.e., the subsequent
holder is entitled to payment irrespective of whether the
bales of hay had been delivered.
The rule that conditional
indorsements do not prevent further transfer or negotiation of
an instrument remains unchanged.
Accord and Satisfaction
The revised ucc clarifies the rules concerning the
contract theory of accord and satisfaction in regard to part
payment checks.
Where the amount due on a contract or
obligation is unliquidated or in dispute and a check is
tendered marked "paid in full", cashing the check by the
creditor-payee has typically been held to be a
full
satisfaction of the claim barring further litigation to
recover any additional sum on that claim.
Of course, the
matter has to be the subject of a legitimate, good faith
dispute.
The perceived difficulty with the accord and
satisfaction concerns the vulnerability of unsuspecting
parties, particularly organizations, who unwittingly cash
checks marked payment in full when the creditor in fact had no
desire to accept the payment as full and final payment.
Revised Article 3 continues to hold that there can be no
accord and satisfaction unless the claim is unliquidated or in
dispute, the "paid in full" designation is made in good faith,
and the creditor cashed the check.
Revised Section 3-311

provides protection to organizations who may unwittingly
accept full payment checks. Revised Section 1-201(28) defines
an organization to include virtually any entity other than an
individual or individual proprietor.
If the claimant is an
organization and before the tender sends a communication that
full satisfaction instruments are to be sent to a designated
person or place, a party who wishes to tender a full
satisfaction instrument must comply. Checks sent to another
party or part of the organization will be ineffective to
create an accord and satisfaction despite the fact they are
cashed by the creditor and bear a conspicuous "paid in full"
designation.
An additional protection is accorded organizations which
do not designate a particular person or location to receive
checks tendered as full payment. The organization may avoid
the result of an accord and satisfaction within 90 days of the
payment of the check by tenjering repayment of the check to
the party who sought the accord and satisfaction. 8
In the
event, however, it is demonstrated that the claimant or an
appropriate agent of the claimant had advance knowledge that
the check was tendered to create an accord and satisfaction,
cashing the check fully discharges the obligation and retendering payment within 90 days is ineffective. 9
Post-Dated Checks
The rule concerning post-dated checks has also been
revised. Prior to revision, a post-dated check was considered
an instrument payable at a future time similar to a time
draft. Post-dated checks were burdensome to banks which had
the duty not to pay them before the date stated on the check.
In light of modern check handling of the huge numbers of
checks processed daily, the revisors have deemed this to be an
unreasonable burden.
Revised Section 4-401 provides that a
check may be post-dated, but a bank is not liable for making
payment on the check before the date stated unless the drawer
had given the bank prior notice. This notice must inform the
bank that a post-dated check may be presented for payment and
advise the bank not to make payment until the stated date.
The effect of this is to put the depositor under the
obligation to issue something in the nature of a stop payment
order.
Secondary Liability of Indorsers
The revisors of the ucc have removed a technical
requirement concerning the responsibility of holders of
commercial paper who may wish to hold secondary parties
liable. The traditional rule requires that an instrument be
presented for payment on the due date to the maker, unless an
appropriate excuse for non-presentment or delayed presentment
exists.
Failure to properly present on the due date
discharges the secondary liability of the indorser.
This
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rule, in existence for many years, fails to recognize that
there is little actual personal presentation of instruments in
the modern business world. Revised Article 3 eliminates the
requirement of presenting instruments on the due date in order
to have the opportunity of holding an indorser liable in the
event of non-payment.
"In the great majority of cases
presentment and notice of dishonor are waived with respect to
notes. In most cases a formal demand for payment to the maker
of the note is not contemplated.
Rather, the maker is
expected to send payment to the holder of the note on the date
or dates on which payment is due. If payment is not made when
due, the holder usually makes a demand for payment, but in
normal case in which presentment is waived, demand 1s
irrelevant and the holder can proceed against indorsers when
payment is not received. Under former Article 3, in the small
minority of cases in which presentment and dishonor were not
waived with respect to notes, the indorser was discharged from
liability (former Section 3-502(1) (a)) unless the holder made
presentment on the exact day the note was due (former Section
3-503 (1) (c)) and gave notice of dishonor to the indorser
before midnight of the third business day after dishonor
(former Section 3-508(2)). These provisions are omitted from
Article 3 as inconsistent with practice which seldom involves
face-to-face dealings. 1110
It should be noted that the
requirement of giving notice of dishonor has been retained,
but the holder has 30 days to give notice of dishonor to the
indorser instead of the 3 days previously
Reporting Forged Drawer's Signature(s)
Another change concerns the amount of time a customer has
to report forgeries of the customer's name as the drawer of a
check. Prior to the revision, a customer that did not report
a forgery of his/her name as drawer, i.e., a signature
apparently issuing a check, within 14 days from the receipt of
a statement showing such a forgery bore the loss for any
subsequent forgeries by the same wrongdoer.
The theory, of
course, was that the customer's negligence in failing to warn
the bank contributed to the loss.
Revised UCC Section 3-406(d) (2) expands the time for the
customer to alert the bank to 30 days. This change recognizes
the greater number of checks issued today by all kinds of
depositors and the practical problems those depositors face in
reconciling their accounts.
In addition, in the event the
depositor fails to alert the bank in the appropriate period of
time, the depositor may still not bear the entire loss. The
revisors have established a standard of comparative negligence
to be applied in such cases. 12
The changes in the UCC described above are not of the
same quantity or magnitude as those contained in the original
UCC. Nevertheless, the changes are substantial. The revisors
have continued to modernize and "fine tune" the law for the

last portion of the twentieth century and beyond. In general,
the revisions seem reasonable and based on sound business
practices.
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